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Abstract
Th   is paper reviews evidence from both industrialized and developing countries on the relationship 
between labour market ﬂ  exibility and employment. It is argued that the notion of ﬂ  exibility and its 
impact is often oversimpliﬁ  ed. Th   e evidence, such as it is, does not provide much support for the 
view that greater ﬂ  exibility results in higher employment. Th   ere is more evidence for an impact on 
the distribution of employment among diﬀ  erent groups of the population, but also eﬀ  ects which 
vary widely between countries. Flexibility needs to be considered within a wider framework of 
policies and institutions to promote decent work.
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Debates on labour market ﬂ  exibility are not new, although the term itself only became popular in the 1980s. 
Historically, the evolution of labour markets has been marked by periods when market forces dominated 
thinking and policy, alternating with periods when there was a spread of institutions to provide representa-
tion or regulate outcomes. Polanyi’s analysis of the development of the capitalist system in the latter part of 
the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century drew particular attention to the tensions which arise 
when economic relationships are separated from their social context, and it is certainly true that much labour 
market regulation reﬂ  ects eﬀ  orts by governments and other actors to address the consequent need for coher-
ence between economic and social goals and relationships. 
Flexibility tends to become a metaphor for unfettered markets. Yet, there is no such thing, for mar-
kets, whether for labour or for anything else, function eﬀ  ectively only because they are surrounded by a set 
of institutions which generate common rules, reﬂ  ect the interests of participants and guide behaviour. Th  is 
is all the more so in the market for labour, which is in reality a social institution, not only supporting work 
and production, but also impacting on representation, social integration and the personal goals of its partici-
pants. So, one must start by being wary of simpliﬁ  ed arguments about the role of labour market institutions.
In industrialized countries, labour market ﬂ  exibility was part of the strategy proposed by the OECD 
in its 1994 Jobs Study—which regarded higher job creation in the US compared with Europe as due to 
greater ﬂ  exibility in the former—and both the World Bank and the IMF have often taken a similar view. Th  e 
2005 World Development Report, for instance, argued that labour market deregulation would improve the 
investment climate, while the IMF has taken the position, in discussions on policy coherence among interna-
tional organizations, that labour market ﬂ  exibility is key to employment creation. However, other views can 
also be found in World Bank publications, while the OECD’s views have evolved, and its 2004 Employment 
Outlook calls for a more pragmatic approach to labour market reform.
At the risk of oversimplifying the discussion, changing views of labour market ﬂ  exibility can be 
interpreted as reﬂ  ecting changes in the model of growth and development. In a Keynesian world, where 
technical change and aggregate demand drive growth, labour market institutions and regulation reﬂ  ect a 
social compromise among social actors, which stabilizes economic relationships. Th   is was the dominant pat-
tern in industrialized countries in the period after the Second World War up to the early 1970s. When this 
model broke down, macro-economic policy shifted towards a more restrictive monetarist stance, emphasiz-
ing control of inﬂ  ation and supply side incentives. In such a world, micro-ﬂ  exibility is essential to generate 
economic adjustments. 
Th   e constituents of the ILO—workers, employers, governments—have quite diﬀ  erent views of this 
issue. Not surprisingly, employers favour ﬂ  exibility more than workers. World Bank surveys in a fairly large 
number of countries found 34 to 38 per cent of ﬁ  rms reporting that employment protection legislation is a 
moderate or major obstacle for them. Equally unsurprising, workers tend to be sceptical of the beneﬁ  ts of 
ﬂ  exibility. And the positions of governments vary widely. So there is no agreed ILO position on this issue, 
despite its obvious importance for the ILO’s decent work agenda.
1 Th   e views expressed here are personal and do not commit the IILS or the ILO. Th   anks are due to Peter Auer for helpful 
comments.2  DESA Working Paper No. 47
The forms of ﬂ  exibility
Th  e  ﬂ  exibility of a labour market might be deﬁ  ned as its ability to adapt and respond to change (Rubery and 
Grimshaw, 2003). Several diﬀ  erent dimensions of ﬂ  exibility are identiﬁ  ed in the literature: 
Employment protection •  . Employer freedom to hire and ﬁ  re is at the heart of debates on ﬂ  exibility. 
Employment protection measures, of course, have a double eﬀ  ect, reducing both inﬂ  ows to and 
outﬂ  ows from employment, so the net impact on employment and unemployment is ambiguous 
a priori. However, reducing these ﬂ  ows overall is likely to limit ﬁ  rms’ ability to adjust to chang-
ing circumstances. Levels of protection vary widely across OECD countries (Figure 1). In most 
countries alongside the protection of regular, standard jobs a variety of temporary or otherwise less 
protected employment statuses are also a widely used means of ﬂ  exibility.
Wage ﬂ  exibility •  . A variety of institutions and regulations may limit wage variation, including mini-
mum wage regulation, trade union activity and the extent to which there is coordinated wage 
bargaining.
Internal or functional ﬂ  exibility •  . Th   is largely concerns the ability of ﬁ  rms to organize and reorganize 
internal processes of production and labour use in the interests of productive/dynamic eﬃ   ciency, e.g. 
through the ﬂ  exibility of working time, job content, skill needs or technical change.
Supply side ﬂ  exibility •  : While attention tends to focus on ﬂ  exibility in labour demand, there are 
important issues on the supply side too. Workers may demand ﬂ  exibility in working time to meet 
work and family needs, or the portability of rights and entitlements which would permit mobility 
between jobs.
A central element of the 
debate on ﬂ  exibility concerns 
the relative importance of adapt-
ability and security. Both ﬁ  rms 
and workers need both. Insofar as 
labour market ﬂ  exibility implies 
a lessening of control of workers 
over their employment, it may 
aﬀ  ect both perceived and real se-
curity. However, attitudes to ﬂ  ex-
ibility and security to a signiﬁ  cant 
degree reﬂ  ect social preferences. 
Some societies give a greater value 
to mobility and others to stabil-
ity. Even at this simple level, there 
is no universal formula. A more 
sophisticated understanding of the 
importance of ﬂ  exibility and sta-
bility for enterprises, and the dif-
ferent forms of security demanded 












































































































































































































































Regulation on temporary forms of employment
Specific requirements for collective dismissal
Protection of regular workers against (individual) dismissal
Source: OECD (2004).
Figure 1.
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The effects of ﬂ  exibility and inﬂ  exibility
Th   ere is a widespread argument today that can be paraphrased as follows: Th   e slow and inadequate growth 
of employment around the world reﬂ  ects labour market institutions which provide a disincentive to job cre-
ation. Highly regulated labour markets were easier to maintain in relatively closed economies, where compet-
itive pressures were less. But globalization has sharply increased the range and intensity of competition, and 
more adaptable production systems and labour markets are essential if ﬁ  rms are to survive in the new global 
economy. Conventional economic models support this argument. In such models, where wages and condi-
tions of work adjust more rapidly to market forces, full employment is much more easily attained. 
So essentially, the argument is that in a globalized economy, ﬂ  exibility is a precondition for employ-
ment creation. How far is this position supported by the evidence? It is an issue on which a great deal of 
work has been undertaken in OECD countries in particular. Th   e results are surprisingly muddy.
First, the relationship between employment protection and aggregate employment or unemploy-
ment is weak. Diﬀ  erent studies show varying diﬀ  erent results. Baker and others (2005) show that the direct 
relationship between employment protection and unemployment is insigniﬁ  cant (Figure 2), and this is con-
ﬁ  rmed by more sophisticated multivariate analyses. Baccaro and Rei (2005) ﬁ  nd the same result in virtually 
all of a wide range of speciﬁ  cations, including corrections for a variety of possible econometric and substan-
tive biases. Other authors report varying results depending on the speciﬁ  cation of their models. Th  e  OECD 
Employment Outlook 2004 concludes, on the basis of extensive empirical work, that employment protection 
does not clearly lead to higher unemployment, although it was found to be associated with lower employ-
ment rates. But Baccaro and Rei’s work does not support the latter conclusion either. 
On the other hand, the 
OECD ﬁ  nds that employment 
protection legislation may change 
the distribution of employment. 
While prime age males beneﬁ  t, 
younger people and women 
seem to be disadvantaged. Th  is 
is plausible, in so far as employ-
ment protection reduces inﬂ  ows 
to employment of labour market 
entrants, though other research, 
e.g. by Schmitt and Wadsworth 
(2002), ﬁ  nds little evidence that 
the more ﬂ  exible US and UK 
labour markets performed better 
for marginal groups. Th   ere is also 
some evidence to support the 
proposition that stricter protec-
tion of regular jobs is associated 
with higher levels of temporary 
and other non-standard contracts.  Source: Baker and others (2005).
Figure 2. 
Labour market institutions and unemployment:  Employment protection4  DESA Working Paper No. 47
Such non-standard employment relationships have been growing, on the whole, over the last twenty years, 
and a considerable literature has emerged on labour market segmentation and ‘insider-outsider’ tradeoﬀ  s, 
with varying interpretations of the causal relationships. 
On wage ﬂ  exibility, the evidence for an adverse eﬀ  ect on employment of minimum wages is also 
weak in OECD countries. Th   ere must be some level of minimum wages that would have such an eﬀ  ect, 
but within the observed range the eﬀ  ect seems to be modest. Another rather consistent ﬁ  nding of research 
in OECD countries is that coordinated wage bargaining does not have an adverse eﬀ  ect on unemployment 
(Figure 3). In fact, multivariate analysis suggests that the relationship with employment is positive. Since 
decentralized wage bargaining is sometimes seen as an important aspect of labour market ﬂ  exibility, this is 
an interesting result. It reﬂ  ects the importance of social dialogue in the debate on ﬂ  exibility, a point to which 
I will return. On the other hand, Baccaro and Rei (2005) ﬁ  nd union density to have a positive impact on 
unemployment, in the absence of bargaining coordination, and argue that this may come from the impact 
on wage levels.
Functional and organizational ﬂ  exibility within ﬁ  rms may well be more important than labour mar-
ket ﬂ  exibility as such, but situations are diverse and evidence correspondingly anecdotal. National models for 
the organization of production vary widely, and local and speciﬁ  c factors are usually involved. Th   e growth of 
global production systems is probably the most signiﬁ  cant factor here, introducing ﬂ  exibility and adaptation 
through new sourcing arrangements which by-pass national policies. 
An important issue concerns the relationship between employment stability, skill development and 
productivity. Auer, Berg and Coulibaly (2004) show that employment tenure has a positive eﬀ  ect on pro-
ductivity at the ﬁ  rm level, at least up to a certain length of tenure. Th   ere is a great deal of case study material 
which shows that job stability is important for training—obviously longer tenure increases the returns to 
investment in job speciﬁ  c training. Other research suggests that longer job tenure is associated with greater 
innovation, where this is knowledge 
intensive, presumably because of the 
importance of on the job learning. 
More innovative ﬁ  rms tend to oﬀ  er 
somewhat longer tenure to their 
workers than less innovative ﬁ  rms. 
Figure 4 also shows that changes in 
tenure across industrialized coun-
tries are positively associated with 
labour productivity growth. But 
there are considerable variations 
in job tenure between countries, 
suggesting there are many pos-
sible institutional frameworks. And 
Auer, Berg and Coulibaly (2004) 
ﬁ  nd tenure is negatively correlated 
with employment rates, hinting at a 
productivity-employment trade-oﬀ  . 
All of this illustrates the complex-
ity of the analysis of labour market  Source: Baker and others (2005).
Figure 3. 
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ﬂ  exibility, since institutions and 
their roles diﬀ  er from country 
to country, making the cross-
country analyses discussed above 
particularly unreliable. 
On the supply side, there 
is wide variation across countries 
in the degree to which work-
ers can move ﬂ  exibly between 
enterprises, maintaining pension 
and other rights, adapt work-
ing time to family needs, and so 
on. Not much research addresses 
the implications for growth and 
employment, but the experience 
of Scandinavian countries, where 
such policies are most advanced, 
suggests that the synergies can be 
positive. Th   ese countries have, on 
the whole, high employment rates 
with low and ﬂ  exible working hours, which contribute to goals of gender equality and permit varying strate-
gies through the life cycle. 
On the whole, it would be risky to draw strong policy conclusions about the impact on employment 
of labour market ﬂ  exibility on the basis of this literature. Th   ere is much that remains unclear, or dependent 
on local factors, in this complex relationship between labour market institutions and employment 
performance. 
And although there is no consensus in the literature, the case can readily be made that aggregate 
demand conditions are more powerful predictors of employment outcomes than labour market regulation. 
After all, even in less ﬂ  exible economies job creation and destruction is fairly large (20 per cent of jobs per 
year in France) so large adjustments do occur all the time. Schmitt and Wadsworth (2002), for instance, 
argue that in both the US and the UK, employment growth can be largely traced to macro-economic policy, 
and that labour market ﬂ  exibility has mainly helped to increase inequality. Baker and others (2005) reach 
similar conclusions. 
Th   e evidence cited thus far comes mainly from the industrialized world. What can be said about 
developing countries?
Th  e  ﬁ  rst and most obvious point is that most developing country labour markets are in reality highly 
ﬂ  exible because of the presence of a large informal economy. Production systems very frequently straddle the 
formal and the informal, there are informal workers in formal enterprises and informal enterprises delivering 
goods and services to formal markets. Th   is does not mean that the informal economy is unregulated—even 
when laws are not fully enforced, they have an indirect eﬀ  ect, and there is a great deal of informal social 
regulation. 
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But it does mean that the discussion of labour market ﬂ  exibility in low income countries cannot rea-
sonably be separated from discussion of informality. It is true that there is a widespread assumption, much as 
in industrialized countries, that part of the employment problem lies in overregulated formal sectors which 
promote dualism and reduce employment levels. As noted above, the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 2005 takes the line that developing country labour markets are widely overregulated, and that this has 
an adverse eﬀ  ect on investment and growth. Th   ey argue that this is true of minimum wages, working time 
and employment protection, among others.
But the data base for such conclusions is much weaker than in industrialized countries, and hard 
evidence on the real impact of regulation on employment growth is scarce. It is true that if the minimum 
wage is set far too high, either it will be ignored or it will constrain employment creation. But in fact the 
evidence, such as it is, does not point to minimum wages as a major constraint on employment growth. On 
the contrary, in many countries it plays an important stabilizing role. Th  e  1996-1997  World Employment 
Report argued that observed minimum wages in most developing countries were unlikely to have a serious 
adverse eﬀ  ect on employment, while real wages tended to move in line with productivity, and to be rather 
ﬂ  exible. More recent ILO work has reached similar conclusions. A recent literature review (Devereux, 2005) 
concluded that carefully designed minimum wage policies do help to reduce poverty. Much depends on the 
interpretation and application of such policies, making it diﬃ   cult to compare country experiences.
Th   e recent experience of Argentina and Chile is consistent with the view that labour market ﬂ  exibili-
ty was not the main factor driving employment growth. In Argentina, for instance, the ﬂ  exibility policies put 
in place in the 1990s appeared to lower employment elasticities rather than raising them (Marshall, 2004), 
so that rapid GDP growth was accompanied by rising or stagnant unemployment. In Chile in the 1990s, 
on the other hand, the gradual re-regulation of the labour market was consistent with continued employ-
ment growth up to the Asian Financial Crisis (ILO, 1998). Recent work by the Asian Development Bank 
also argues that while some labour reforms are needed, labour policies are not the main cause of increasing 
unemployment and persistent underemployment in Asia (ADB 2006).
In Latin America, more systematic work by Marquez and Pages (1998) is interesting in that it mir-
rors to some extent the ﬁ  ndings in industrialized countries—employment protection legislation does reduce 
job turnover, and is associated with greater self-employment (which can be interpreted as an indicator of 
dualism), and perhaps less wage employment, for younger and older workers at least, but not necessarily 
with lower employment overall. In other words, the distributional implications may be more important than 
the aggregate impact. On the whole, while employment protection is strong in Latin America, job turnover 
is high and tenure low, an inconsistency which is hard to explain unless it simply reﬂ  ects poor implementa-
tion of the legislation.
In those situations, the real issue is the construction of universal policies and institutions. We should 
note that the inﬂ  uence of formal regulation reaches deep into the informal economy—minimum wage legis-
lation for instance, clearly aﬀ  ects informal wages even when it is not fully enforced. We should also note that 
there is little evidence that reducing the levels of protection of the formal economy is likely to help to reduce 
informality. But there may be institutional strategies in which a more ﬂ  exible approach to the formal econo-
my is part of a universal strategy in which there are also more serious eﬀ  orts to construct viable frameworks 
of regulation which embrace the informal. In that context, the work of Galli and Kucera (2003) shows that 
countries with stronger civic rights (basically freedom of association) have a higher share of formal employ-
ment. So such rights may well play an important part in constructing a coherent policy response.Labour Market Flexibility and Decent Work           7
Labour institutions and social models
We have seen that the empirical evidence is mixed. But this should not really be a surprise. Labour market 
ﬂ  exibility or rigidity is in general only one aspect of a broader social model. In reality, labour market institu-
tions are or can be ways of accommodating diﬀ  erent interests and achieving sustainable results. Diﬀ  erent 
combinations of policies and institutions may achieve similar goals. In Europe, the debate on the future of 
the social model has made it clear that there are a number of quite diﬀ  erent routes being taken in diﬀ  er-
ent countries. Table 1, taken from work by Peter Auer, suggests one typology, in which high employment 
protection and expenditures on labour market policy complement or substitute for each other in diﬀ  erent 
countries. Recently the ‘Danish model’ of ﬂ  exicurity, in which low employment protection is combined with 
eﬀ  ective income protection and labour market policy to provide occupational or career security, has received 
particular attention. But there are diﬀ  erent ways of combining ﬂ  exibility and security, and the Swedish and 
Finnish approaches provide another, diﬀ  erent example, embracing high public expenditure on social ser-
vices, ﬂ  exibility for enterprises, labour market security for workers, and an egalitarian framework of values in 
which all actors have both rights and responsibilities (Lefebvre and Méda, 2006).
Th   e basic issue is to ﬁ  nd a balance between employment protection provided at the level of the ﬁ  rm 
(or the public sector), and social protection and income security provided at the societal level. When a ﬁ  rm 
is embedded in broader institutions of social protection, it is much easier to achieve a negotiated ﬂ  exibility 
at the enterprise level, than where the worker is exclusively dependent on the ﬁ  rm—unless, as was the case in 
Japan, the ﬁ  rm itself plays this broader role (Dore, 1986). Workers likewise need ﬂ  exibility in order to take 
advantage of new labour market opportunities, and that too has implications for the design of institutions 
for protection—for it may be that the best way to increase security will be to increase the portability of rights 
between jobs, in a framework of ‘protected mobility’. 
The goal of decent work: Flexibility, security and dialogue
How does these issues relate to the ILO goal of decent work? In reality, the decent work agenda constitutes 
a framework for social policy which integrates many of these elements. Each country has its own social goals 
and institutions, but there are broad goals which are widely shared: the importance of access to productive 
employment for all; security of work and income, and in the workplace; respect for core rights at work, in-
cluding freedom from coercion and discrimination, and freedom of association; and a democratic process of 
negotiation and social dialogue by which these goals are set and achieved. Th   is concerns the dignity of work 
and gender equality in work, and the role of work in social integration and personal development. Th  ese  are 
all elements of a decent work agenda.
Achieving decent work calls for a coherent set of policies for employment promotion and protec-
tion, for security and income support, for the promotion of equality in opportunity and access, for rights at 
Table 1. 
Employment security or labour market security?
High labour market policy spending Low labour market policy spending
High Employment Protection France, Germany Japan, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain
Low Employment Protection Denmark, Belgium, (Netherlands), Finland, 
(Ireland)
United States, United Kingdom
Source: Auer (2006).8  DESA Working Paper No. 47
work—but also for competitive and eﬀ  ective production systems, in which adaptability and innovation are 
key. It involves not only public action, but also representative institutions through which social actors can 
express their views and participate in decisions. It is precisely this combination of institutions and policies 
which constitutes a social model. And because work is in many ways the point of articulation between eco-
nomic and social goals, it makes sense to build coherence in economic and social policy on this foundation. 
Within that framework, the issue of ﬂ  exibility can be adequately addressed only by considering its 
multiple eﬀ  ects and the packages of measures of which it might be part. If there are tradeoﬀ  s, e.g. between 
security and employment, it is necessary to ﬁ  nd institutional and policy frameworks which can address both. 
For instance, if employment protection legislation is an important source of security, and has little overall 
eﬀ  ect on employment, but has an impact on labour market segmentation or exclusion, a coherent approach 
will require complementary active measures aimed at promoting employment for excluded groups. Weaken-
ing employment protection overall may undermine other goals without necessarily improving labour market 
opportunities. 
While a wide variety of approaches may work in diﬀ  erent situations, one important lesson from 
successful experiences in both Europe and elsewhere is the essential nature of broad participation and social 
dialogue in the process. Institutions which involve tradeoﬀ  s among objectives and the diﬀ  erent interests of 
diﬀ  erent groups cannot be easily imposed from above. Th   ey need to be constructed by the actors concerned, 
if they are to achieve legitimacy and stability. Representative organizations of workers and employers have 
played a vital role in many countries in achieving solutions in the common interest.
In the end, labour market regulation is about what society you want to create—economic success is 
only part of the picture. Within eﬀ  orts to achieve decent work, the ﬂ  exibility of employment relationships 
is part of a much wider balance. Th   e real issue lies in constructing the institutions that can achieve that 
balance.Labour Market Flexibility and Decent Work           9
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